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NOTES
GREGORY K.: CHILD STANDING IN
PARENTAL TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOSTER
PARENT-FOSTER CHILD RELATIONSHIP
ON THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD
Traditionally, the state has protected citizens unable to defend
their own interests.' Although parents are generally the protec-
1 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). "Acting to guard the gen-
eral interest in [the] youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the par-
ent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and
in many other ways." Id.; People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 501 (Cal. 1945). The curfew in
question was a necessary exercise of the state's authority. Id. Contra Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966). "There is much evidence that some juvenile courts...
lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of
the State in a Parens Patriae capacity . . . ." Id.; Gilbert T. Venable, Note, The Parens
Patriae Theory and the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REv.
894, 896 (1966). The concept of parens patriae can be traced back to English common law in
Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P.Wms. 103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722). Id. at 896-97. "[T]he king,
as Parens Patriae, hath the protection of all his subjects; and in particular manner is to
take care of all those who by reason of their want of understanding are incapable of taking
care of themselves and their own affairs." Id. at 895. "It is incomprehensible that the [state]
should not possess the power to come to the aid of helpless children who are suffering abuse
at the hands of their parents or guardians." Id. at 897. Seegenerally THEODORE J. STEIN,
CHILD WELFARE AND THE LAw 26-28 (1991) (discussing historical roots of parens patriae
doctrine).
The idea that the king should act as "parent of the nation" was the basis of the parens
patriae theory accepted by the American courts. See Venable, supra, at 897; see also Jac-
queline Y. Parker, Dissolving Family Relations: Termination of the Parent-Child Rela-
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tors of their children, 2 they sometimes fail to fulfill their parental
duties. In such situations, the state, as parens patriae, must in-
tervene on the child's behalf.' Parens patriae means "parent of the
country," and signifies the state's well-established duty to inter-
vene on behalf of individuals under legal disability.4 In a limited
number of situations, the state's obligation to intervene is limited
by the constitutional concepts of freedom of expression and the
right of privacy.5 These exceptions to the state's overall role as
tions-An Overview, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 555, 556 (1986). The justification for invoking
the modern day parens patriae includes: (1) a child, by definition, lacks capacity and experi-
ence; (2) society as a whole has much to gain from a child who will tomorrow be a produc-
tive adult; and (3) a child who is not raised properly may later become a delinquent. Id.
2 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982). Parents' rights are rooted in the
Fourteenth Amendment's grant of liberty. Id.; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
"[P]arents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for the judg-
ment required for making life's difficult decisions .... [H]istorically [the law] has recog-
nized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their chil-
dren." Id. at 602; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972). The Amish parents had
the right to remove their children from the public school system. Id.; Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Parents' interest in the care and custody of their children is a funda-
mental liberty. Id.; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). It was the
parents' right to choose appropriate mental and religious training for their children. Id.;
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). Parents have the fundamental right to con-
trol the education of their children. Id. See generally Alison M. Brumley, Comment, Paren-
tal Control of a Minor's Right to Sue in Federal Court, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 333, 341-46 (1991)
(discussing scope and limit of parental authority).
3 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 828
(1977). The family court has the authority to intervene and order that a child be placed into
the foster care system if it finds that the child was abused or neglected. Id.; see also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). The state has a compelling interest in protecting
children from being exploited in pornographic depictions. Id.; Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 639 (1968). It is a considerable risk to expose minors to sexually explicit material.
Id.; In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). The state may justifia-
bly intervene where parents fail to provide a minor with adequate medical treatment. Id.;
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 771-72 (111. 1952). The state was permit-
ted to order a blood transfusion for a minor, over the objections of the parents who were
Jehovah Witnesses, forbidden to receive blood from other human beings. Id.; In re Cicero,
101 Misc. 2d 699, 702-03, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1979). The state
may intervene and over objections of the parents, order an operation on a newborn infant to
correct a spina bifida abnormality. Id. See generally Jennifer Bellah, Comment, Appointing
Counsel for the Child in Actions to Terminate Parental Rights, 70 CAL. L. RE V. 481, 487-88
(1982) (state should secure stable adoptive home if security and stability is lacking in bio-
logical family home); Parker, supra note 1, at 564-65. The state's interest is based on a need
for child protection when the parents fail to fulfill their role. Id.; Venable, supra note 1, at
905. "Against these sacred private interests [of the parents] stand the interests of society to
protect the welfare of the children, and the state's assertion of authority to that end .....
Id.
4 See Parker, supra note 1, at 566. Parens patriae represents the "historical doctrinal
foundation for protecting children from abuse and neglect." Id.; see also BLAcK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). "Parens Patriae, literally 'parent of the country,' refers tradi-
tionally to the role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability,
such as juveniles or the insane. . . ." Id.
5 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979). The statute requiring a minor to get
parental consent for an abortion was an unwarranted intrusion on a child's right to pri-
vacy, and therefore, unconstitutional. Id.; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
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parens patriae, however, do not represent a general principle that
would allow a state to neglect its duty in favor of recognizing a
child's constitutional rights. Thus, if the state finds that a child
has been abused or neglected, it can, regardless of a child's right to
privacy, institute a proceeding to terminate parental rights.7 Any
party seeking parental termination must first demonstrate stand-
ing." Generally, the state or a state-authorized agency, deriving
its power from the parens patriae doctrine, will petition the court
for the termination.9 Recently, however, in In re Gregory K,10 a
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). The state is prohibited from suppressing a child's freedom
of expression in school. Id. The state must respect the child's fundamental right to freedom
of expression. Id. at 511. "In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views." Id.; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). Children have the right to counsel in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. Id.
6 See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981). A statute requiring immature and
dependent minors to notify their parents before undergoing an abortion is constitutional.
Id.; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). While children have constitutional
rights, the state's power "to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its
authority over adults." Id.; Venable, supra note 1, at 911. "While a child should not be
reprimanded for expressing unpopular views or participating in peaceful demonstrations, it
is submitted that the fact that he is engaged in a protected activity should not insulate him
from parens patriae power.' Id.
7 See In re K.S., 713 S.W.2d 858, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (prior neglect or abuse by
parent may justify parental termination if in child's best interests); see also In re J.H. v.
R.F.H., 572 So. 2d 629, 633 (La. Ct. App. 1990) ("best interests of children dictate termina-
tion of parental rights"); In re T.K., 568 So. 2d 636, 642 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (parental termi-
nation is warranted if in best interests of children); In re P.E.B., 708 S.W.2d 315, 319 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[elven though reunification of the family is the desired outcome in [paren-
tal termination proceedings], the best interests of the children are controlling"); Nebraska
v. Brungardt, 319 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Neb. 1982) (father's "inability to secure and maintain
employment, his use and abuse of drugs, and his propensity to physical violence all indicate
to a sufficient degree that he is an unfit parent and that the best interests of the children
... are best served by the termination of... parental rights"); Nebraska v. Linden, 306
N.W.2d 151, 155 (Neb. 1981) (cardinal issue in parental rights' termination cases is deter-
mining best interests of child); In re Parker, 368 S.E.2d 879, 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (court
must issue order of parental termination unless it "determinels] that best interests of child
require that parental rights of such parent not be terminated" (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7H-289.31(a))); In re Carlita B., 408 S.E.2d 365, 368 (W. Va. 1991) (in parental termina-
tion cases, court must consider best interests of child, including "whether continued associ-
ation with siblings in other placement is in such child's best interests" (explaining James
M. v. Maynard, 408 S.E.2d 400, 410 (W. Va. 1991))).
8 See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing general standing principles).
9 See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 232.9 (Deering 1990) ("The State Department of Social Serv-
ices .... [a public] adoption agency... may initiate an action... to declare a child free from
the custody and control of [the] parents."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.461(1) (West 1992 & Supp.
1993) (Florida provides for "authorized agent of the department" to initiate parental termi-
nation proceedings); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-18 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) ("An approved
agency... may institute an action... seeking the termination of the rights of the par-
ents.... ."); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 384-b(3)(b) (McKinney 1984) ("A proceeding under this
section may be originated by an authorized agency. . . ."); 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
§ 2512(a)(2) (1991) ("A petition to terminate parental rights... may be filed by ... an
agency.").
10 No. JU90-5245 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992).
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Florida juvenile court granted a child standing to initiate the ter-
mination of his natural mother's parental rights." The Florida
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, however, appropriately
held that the child lacked the requisite capacity to initiate such a
proceeding. 12
In 1984, Gregory Kingsley, then four years old, was placed in
the custody of his biological father.'3 During the following four
years, his natural mother, Rachel Kingsley, failed to maintain
contact with Gregory.' 4 In 1989, a report was filed under the Flor-
ida Protective Services System alleging neglect and physical
abuse by Gregory's father.'" At that time, Ms. Kingsley regained
custody of Gregory only to place him voluntarily in foster care five
months later.16 Stating that her intent was to relinquish custody
for only a month, Gregory's mother, in fact, left him in the custody
of the state for approximately eleven months.'7 Thereafter, Ms.
Kingsley regained custody until October of 1990, when the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") received a
report stating that Gregory needed foster care because he was
emotionally disturbed and his mother "could not cope with [him]
any longer." 18 One week after HRS received this report, they re-
moved Gregory from Ms. Kingsley's custody and placed him in fos-
ter care. 19 During the eleven months that Gregory was in the care
of his foster family, he repeatedly declared his desire to be
adopted.2 ° Consequently, in June of 1992, Gregory, who was then
twelve years old, instituted a proceeding to terminate his natural
11 Id. at 1.
12 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8645, at *6-7 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 18,
1993).
13 Gregory K., No. JU90-5245, slip op. at 4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992); see also Peti-
tioner's Complaint at 3, In re Gregory K., No. JU90-5245 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 9, 1992) (com-
plaint noted that there was dispute between natural mother and natural father as to
whether mother consented to the arrangement or whether natural father forcibly took the
children).
14 Petitioner's Complaint at 3-4, Gregory K., (No. JU90-5245) (natural mother did not
visit Gregory for period of four years while child was with father).
15 Id. at 4 (report alleged "neglect, conditions in the home which were hazardous to
health, inadequate supervision and physical abuse").
16 Id.
17 Id. Ms. Kingsley left Gregory in the state's custody until August 1990. Id.
18 Id. (mother told HRS that she wished to place child up for adoption).
19 Petitioner's Complaint at 5, Gregory K., (No. JU90-5245).
20 Id. at 9. Gregory had consistently stated to numerous individuals, on many occasions,
the desire to terminate his relationship with his natural parents and to seek adoption with





Writing for the lower court, Judge Thomas S. Kirk held that
Gregory had legal standing to pursue termination of the parent-
child relationship.2 2 Judge Kirk reasoned that Gregory was enti-
tled to the same constitutional rights enjoyed by "all natural per-
sons."23 Further, the court found it to be in Gregory's best inter-
ests to sever his ties with his natural mother.24 In making this
determination, a controlling factor the court considered was the
bond that Gregory had developed with his foster family.25
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that Gregory lacked
the capacity to initiate a parental termination proceeding.26 The
court maintained that the "disability of nonage" prevents a minor
from instituting such an action.27
This Comment explores two issues pertaining to parental termi-
nation proceedings, which are the subjects of recent debate within
the legal community. Part I discusses whether a child has stand-
ing to institute a parental termination proceeding by tracing the
21 See In re Gregory K., No. JU90-5245 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992).
22 Order on Standing, In re Gregory K, No. C192-5127 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 20, 1992).
23 Id. In determining that Gregory had standing, the court cited four sections of Article I
of the Florida Constitution: Section 2 guarantees to "all natural persons the right to pursue
happiness"; section 9 guarantees that "all natural persons shall be afforded due process of
law"; section 21 guarantees that "all natural persons shall be afforded access to the courts
of this state"; and section 23 guarantees that "all natural persons shall have the right to
make private choices." Id.
24 See Gregory K., No. JU90-5245, slip op. at 9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992); see also infra
notes 108-113 and accompanying text (discussing Gregory K court's best interests
analysis).
25 See Gregory K, No. JU90-5245, slip op. at 9; see also infra notes 108-113 and accompa-
nying text (discussing foster family's influential role in determination of best interests in
Gregory K).
26 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8645, at *6-7 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 18,
1993). Although the Court of Appeals found that Gregory lacked standing, the court con-
cluded that the trial court's error was harmless because separate petitions for termination
of parental rights were filed on Gregory's behalf by his foster father and foster mother, the
guardian ad litem, and HRS. Id. In addition, the court held:
(2) the applicable burden of proof in all termination of parental rights proceedings is
clear and convincing evidence; (3) the record supports the trial court's findings of clear
and convincing evidence of abandonment; (4) the trial court erred when it tried the
termination and adoption proceedings simultaneously, but such error was harmless;
and (5) the trial court committed reversible error when it entered the adoption order.
Id.
27 Id. at *7. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, traditionally, courts have held that
unemancipated minors do not have the requisite legal capacity to initiate legal proceedings
in their own name. Id.; cf Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, slip op. at 6-7 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 18, 1993). In Twigg, the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit ruled that
Kimberly Mays had standing to institute a proceeding to terminate her natural parents
rights. Id. The Twigg court followed the reasoning in Gregory K, and held that because
Kimberly was a natural person under the Florida Constitution, she, like all other natural
persons, should be afforded access to the courts of Florida. Id.
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history of child standing and examining the standing require-
ments of parental termination proceedings. This section also ex-
amines the soundness of granting a child standing to terminate
parental rights. Part II discusses the "best interests" standard
and the extent to which the relationship between a child and his
foster parents should be considered in this evaluation. This sec-
tion also compares Gregory K with a recent New York Court of
Appeals case, which held that the rights of biological parents are
always superior, and hence, the relationship between foster par-




The United States Constitution guarantees all natural persons
access to the courts of this country.28 Before a court can adjudicate
a matter, however, it must determine that the parties to the ac-
tion have standing. 29 In order to demonstrate standing, a party
must show that he or she has an individual or representative ca-
pacity, or possesses a tangible interest in the lawsuit.3° Once a
28 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "[Nol
person [shall] be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.;
see also Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1153 (5th Cir. 1982). Access to the courts of this
country is a "fundamental constitutional right." Id.; Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028,
1040 (Ct. Cl. 1977). "It is a fundamental principle ... that access to the courts ... should be
made available to all citizens at all times." Id.
29 See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, which provides, in pertinent part: "The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and], the Laws of
the United States... [and] to Controversies... between Citizens of different States; [and]
between Citizens of the same State ... ." Id.; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962). Before a federal court can adjudicate a matter, it must find that the legal rights of
the litigants are in actual controversy. Id.; Selz v. Una, 73 U.S. 327, 333-34 (1867). "Inter-
position of a court of equity cannot be successfully invoked . . . unless the party asking
relief is able to show that he has a legal or equitable right or title in the subject-matter of
the controversy." Id. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L.
REv. 68, 71-87 (1984). The author discusses general principles of standing and traces the
metamorphosis of standing in federal courts. Id.
30 See Dafoe v. Dafoe, 69 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Neb. 1955). The court stated that "it is neces-
sary.., that... [the plaintiff]... have ... a remedial interest which the ... forum can
recognize and enforce." Id.; see also Mixon v. Grinker, 157 A.D.2d 423,427-28, 556 N.Y.S.2d
855, 858-59 (1st Dep't 1990). The court held that the plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation
advocating the rights of homeless persons, had standing in its representative capacity to
bring an action to require the city to provide noncongregate housing to HIV-infected home-
less persons; but only upon a determination that such persons could not, due to illness,
poverty, health problems, or unfamiliarity with legal process, seek relief on their own be-
half. Id.; Leo v. General Elec. Co., 145 A.D.2d 291, 295, 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (2d Dep't
1989). Several fishermen's associations had standing to seek monetary and injunctive relief
[Vol. 8:501
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party has demonstrated standing, the court can invoke its juris-
diction to settle the dispute.3 1
B. Child Standing
It is a well-settled rule that children cannot bring an action on
their own behalf, nor can they defend a suit brought against
them.3 2 Rather, the law requires that children be represented by a
legally competent person.33 The rationale for this rule can be
traced back to the common-law concept ofprochein ami, the child's
"next friend" or legal representative.3 4 This common-law concept
represents the general rule in the United States. 5 The state has
from a river polluter in their representative capacity because the relief would benefit those
members actually injured. Id.; Grant v. Cuomo, 130 A.D.2d 154, 159, 518 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108
(1st Dep't 1987), affd, 73 N.Y.2d 820, 534 N.E.2d 32, 537 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1988). A child
abuse organization had standing to compel New York City to comply with statutory provi-
sions requiring that the city investigate reports of child abuse within 24 hours. Id. The
abused children were not themselves able to seek a judicial remedy, and it was not likely
that parents or caretakers, the objects of the claims of abuse or maltreatment, would un-
dertake to secure a remedy. Id.; Abrams v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 48 A.D.2d 69, 70-73, 368
N.Y.S.2d 165, 166-69 (1st Dep't 1975). The petitioner did not have standing to bring suit
because his rights were not "directly and specifically" affected. Id.
31 See Halpin v. Perales, 153 Misc. 2d 932, 934, 583 N.Y.S.2d 722, 724 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1992). Once a plaintiff demonstrates standing, a court can invoke its jurisdiction.
Id. In order to satisfy the standing requirements, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that: (1)
he has suffered injury in fact, and (2) that the interest he is asserting is one which is within
the interest sought to be protected by the statute. Id.; see also Norwick v. Rockefeller, 70
Misc. 2d 923, 929, 334 N.Y.S.2d 571, 577 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1972). The court held
that once the petitioning party demonstrates a "personal stake" in the outcome, the court
could settle the dispute. Id.
32 See Pintek v. Superior Court, 277 P.2d 265, 268 (Ariz. 1954). A minor was not permit-
ted to petition the court in his behalf, instead, the court required that a guardian initiate
the intestacy proceeding. Id.; see also Allen v. Hickman, 383 P.2d 676, 678 (Okla. 1963).
The appointing of a law guardian was obligatory and based upon safeguarding the interests
of children; it is not just a mere formality. Id.
33 See FED R. Civ. P. 17(c) which provides:
Infants or Incompetent Persons. When an infant or incompetent person has a repre-
sentative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An
infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may
sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or
shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or in-
competent person.
Id.; FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.210(B). The Florida Legislature codified the identical provision in its
rules of civil procedure. Id.; The terms "next friend" and "guardian ad litem" are used inter-
changeably. Id.; see also ROBERT HOROWITZ & SETH G. HUNTER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
74 (1984). It is the traditional rule that minors cannot initiate proceedings on their own
behalf, but must be represented by a competent adult. Id.
34 See HOROWITZ & HUNTER, supra note 33, at 74. The child's "next friend" and "guardian
ad litem" are concepts that grew out of the common law "prochein ami." Id.; see also
BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1206 (6th ed. 1990). "Prochein ami" is defined as some friend who
will appear as a plaintiff on behalf of the child. Id.
35 See, e.g., Domann v. Pence, 326 P.2d 260, 262 (Kan. 1958) (infant sued for injuries
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traditionally shielded children from the adversarial system be-
cause children are deemed to lack the requisite capacity and expe-
rience to function in such an environment.36 Shielding children
from the courtroom is but another manifestation of the state's ob-
ligation as parens patriae.
C. Standing in Parental Termination Proceedings
Traditionally, the United States government has followed a pol-
icy of nonintervention with respect to family disputes.3" This pol-
icy has been established, in part, by this country's constitutional
respect for the privacy of the family unit, which is often capable of
resolving most of its own disputes.3 9 Consequently, the law
sustained in car accident through "next friend"); Johnston County v. Ellis, 38 S.E.2d 31, 38(N.C. 1946) ("next friend" represented minors in foreclosure proceeding); In re Eltingon's
Estate, 192 Misc. 836, 840, 77 N.Y.S.2d 492, 496 (Sur. Ct. New York County 1947) (minor
petitioned court to reopen prior decrees via special guardian).
36 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976). The Danforth Court rec-
ognized the vulnerability of children and made absolutely clear that minors are not suited
to make certain complex decisions. Id. The court stated, in pertinent part, that: "Certain
decisions are .. . outside the scope of a minor's ability to act in his own best interest." Id.;
see also HoRowITz & HUNTER, supra note 33, at 73. American courts have traditionally
taken the view that children are legally incompetent and/or disabled. Id. The disability
exists because of lack of experience and maturity, which prevents children from under-
standing the full implications of a situation. Id.; John D. Goetz, Note, Children's Rights
Under the Burger Court: Concern for the Child but Deference to Authority, 60 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1214, 1219 (1985). "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, mi-
nors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them." Id. (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979));
cf. Brumley, supra note 2, at 352. A child's ability to make mature decisions varies with the
subject-matter involved. Id. Although it is the state's duty to protect children, it has been
suggested that in certain, less complex situations, experienced children should have the
right to make their own decisions. Id.
37 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (state has duty, under doctrine of parens
patriae, to protect those who, because of their want of understanding, are unable to protect
themselves; this concept clearly includes children who lack experience, maturity, and
knowledge of fully competent adults).
38 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). "[F]reedom of personal choice in
matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id.; see also Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but Not Heard: Reflec-
tions on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76, 109 (1984). "The tradi-
tional family relationship, according to the Supreme Court, has 'its origins entirely apart
from the power of the State,' is 'deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition.'" Id.(quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977)); Goetz, supra
note 36, at 1226. "The traditional view, long recognized by the Supreme Court, is that 'the
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.'"
Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
For a fictional account of society under complete paternalism, see ALDous HuxLEY,
BRAvE NEW WORLD (1946).
39 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Needfor Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv.
879, 888-89 (1984) (discussing importance of family in today's society); see also Stephen W.
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presumes that the natural parents will advance the best interests
of their child.4"
In the United States, however, many children are subjected by
their parents to abuse and neglect. 41 In these situations, the pre-
sumption in favor of parental autonomy is obviated by the state's
role, as parens patriae, to intervene on the child's behalf.42 If the
state then determines that returning the child to the natural par-
ents would endanger the child's welfare, it can initiate and subse-
quently order the termination of parental rights.4 3 The act
Hayes & Michael J. Morse, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in Wisconsin: Straining
the Wisdom of Solomon, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 439, 440-41 (1983). American society places a
great deal of importance on the family unit. Id. It is additionally noted that courts have
recognized the family's constitutional right to privacy. Id.
4o See Bartlett, supra note 39, at 887-88 (law does not create parental rights, rather, it
presumes such rights exist); Gloria Christopherson, Minnesota Adopts a Best Interests
Standard in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings: In re J.J.B., 71 MINN. L. REV. 1263,
1267 (1987) ("Presumption has always been that parents will provide better care for their
children than the state could provide."); Susan B. Fallek, In the Child's Best Interests: Ter-
mination of Parental Rights in Minnesota: In re J.J.B., 10 HAmLuNE L. REv. 693, 704 (1987)
(presumably, natural parents are best suited to care of their children); Brumley, supra note
2, at 342 (parents have an innate affection for their children and are therefore most able to
determine what is best for them); Goetz, supra note 36, at 1226 ("primary role of the par-
ents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition"); Hayes & Morse, supra note 39, at 440-41 (citing authority of parents
over children as basic principle in Anglo-American culture); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note,
Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 683
(1987) (normal presumption is that parents will do what is best for their children); Monrad
G. Paulsen, Comment, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 679,
679 (1966) ("In America, raising children is the business of the parents, not of
government.").
41 SAMUEL M. DAvIs & MORTIMER D. ScHwARTz, CmLDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAw 170-71
(1987). Many children are abused and neglected in the United States today. Id.; see Fallek,
supra note 40, at 7 10-11. There is a high incidence of abuse and neglect in today's society.
Id.; Howard Davidson, Not to Worry, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 2, 1992, at A13. "Child
maltreatment in this country now constitutes, in the words of the U.S. Advisory Board on
Child Abuse, a 'national emergency.'" Id.
42 See, e.g., DAvIs & ScHwARTz, supra note 41, at 166-69. Neglectful and abusive parent-
ing justifies state intervention. Id.; Fallek, supra note 40, at 711. Child abuse and neglect
statistics tend to increase the state's intervention in order to ensure the proper welfare of
children. Id.; Parker, supra note 1, at 586-96. Parental termination may be permitted be-
cause of abandonment or physical and mental incapacity of the parents. Id. Other grounds
for termination of parental rights include general unfitness, neglect, or even child abuse.
Id.; Brumley, supra note 2, at 343. The state can intrude upon parents' traditional domain
if the parents are guilty of abuse or neglect, or if there is some other significant governmen-
tal interest that supports the intrusion. Id.; see also LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEm BEST INTER-
EST? 17 (1992). "[I]t is clear that many children are now neglected and abused." Id. Chil-
dren should not be subjected to abuse or neglect. Id. The termination of parental rights is,
in certain situations, a formidable solution. Id.
43 See MARK HARDIN & ANN SHALLEc, COURT RULES To ACHIEVE AcTIvE PERMANENCY
FOR FOSTER CHILDREN: SAMPLE RULES AND COMMENTARY 97 (1985). The termination of pa-
rental rights via a parental termination proceeding extinguishes the rights and duties of
the natural parents toward the child. Id. The parent no longer has the duty to financially
support the child. Id. Moreover, the parent has no right to visit and communicate with the
child. Id.; Parker, supra note 1, at 557. Once the termination proceeding is complete, the
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whereby a natural parent's rights are terminated is one with
profound consequences, as it transforms a family into nothing
more than a group of strangers. 4 As a result of this severity and
the courts' reluctance to intrude into the family unit, states have
enacted legislation specifically setting forth how such proceedings
should be conducted and who has standing to initiate them.45 In
most states, parental-termination statutes permit an agency to in-
stitute the action. 46 Other states have broader parental-termina-
tion provisions, whereby the action may be initiated by "any per-
son who has knowledge of the facts" 47 or "any interested party."41
1. The Prudence of Granting Children Standing
New York and Pennsylvania have drafted statutes that leave
little room for interpretation and prevent children from initiating
parental-termination suits. 49 These statutes reserve serious deci-
only vestige of the parent-child relationship that remains is religious affiliation. Id.
44 See HARDIN & SHALLECK, supra note 43, at 97. "The [action] to terminate parental
rights is profoundly serious." Id. This action is severe because, "typically, termination of
parental rights results in a total severance of the normal parent-child relationship, render-
ing the family into strangers." Id.; see also Parker, supra note 1, at 557. Parental termina-
tion has far-reaching consequences. Id.; Bob Cohn, Johnny, Put Down Those Legos and
Turn Off the Nintendo. Your Lawyer's on the Phone., NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 88.
"Indeed severing the parent-child tie is always considered the last resort." Id.
45 See Parker, supra note 1, at 558 (after discussing termination of parental rights in
child abuse and neglect cases, the exacting termination procedure is discussed); see also
STEIN, supra note 1, at 71 (courts scrutinize parental termination statutes very closely);
Cohn, supra note 44, at 88 ("presumption for keeping the child with his natural parents is
rightfully strong.... ").
46 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(b) (McKinney 1984) (permitting only authorized
agency or foster parent to originate proceeding); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(a) (1991) (grant-
ing only parents, agency, and individuals having custody authority to file petition to termi-
nate); see also Martha Matthews, The Sadness Behind the Sensational, THE RECORDER,
Oct. 8, 1992, at 8 ("Usually, the social services agency.., brings a termination petition.");
cf Deborah Snarp & Carol J. Castaneda, "Divorced" Youth in a New Role, USA TODAY,
Sept. 28, 1992, at 3A (discussing unique right of 12 year old in Gregory K to terminate
parental rights).
47 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.461(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
48 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 233 (Deering 1990) (petition may be filed by an interested
party); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1564 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (same); Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Pritchett, 374 S.E.2d 500, 501-02 (1988) (interpreting South Carolina statute as including
foster parents); In re Eugene W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 741 (Cal. 1972) ("interested person,"
under California statute, is one with "direct, and not merely consequential, interest in the
action").
49 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(3)(b) (McKinney 1984) which provides:
A proceeding under this section may be originated by an authorized agency or by a
foster parent authorized to do so pursuant to section three hundred ninety-two of this
chapter or to section one thousand fifty-five of the family court act or, if an authorized
agency ordered by the court to originate a proceeding under this section fails to do so
within the time fixed by the court, by a law guardian or guardian ad litem of the child
on the court's direction.
Id.; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(a) (1991) provides:
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sions to a specified group of mature individuals, not to vulnerable,
inexperienced, and short-sighted children. Florida's parental-ter-
mination statute, ° on the other hand, provides that "any person
who has knowledge of the facts alleged" has standing to petition
the court to terminate the rights of the natural parents.5, Few
cases, however, have interpreted this statute's broad language.5 2
The lower court in Gregory K, nonetheless, interpreted the stat-
ute to include a twelve-year-old child.5 3 In so doing, the court
granted children the right to petition for the termination of their
(a) Who may file-A petition to terminate parental rights with respect to a child
under the age of 18 years may be filed by any of the following:
(1) Either parent when termination is sought with respect to the other parent.
(2) An agency.
(3) The individual having custody or standing in loco parentis to the child and who
has filed a report of intention to adopt required by section 2531 [relating to report of
intention to adopt].
(b) Contents-The petition shall set forth specifically those grounds and facts alleged
as the basis for terminating parental rights. The petition filed under this section shall
also contain an averment that the petitioner will assume custody of the child until
such time as the child is adopted. If the petitioner is an agency it shall not be required
to aver that an adoption is presently contemplated nor that a person with a present
intention to adopt exists.
(c) Father not identified-If the petition does not identify the father of the child, it
shall state whether a claim of paternity has been filed under section 8303 [relating to
claim of paternity].
Id.; see In re Dana Marie E., 123 Misc. 2d 112, 115, 473 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010 (Family Ct.
Queens County 1983) (city commissioner entitled to originate termination proceedings); In
re V.S., 90 Misc. 2d 139, 142, 394 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (Sur. Ct. New York County 1977)
(foster care agency could institute termination proceedings); In re Adoption of J.F., 572
A.2d 223, 225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (wife of natural parent not entitled to institute termina-
tion proceedings); In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., 480 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(foster parents have no right to initiate parental termination proceedings); Joseph R. Car-
rieri, Gregory K.: A Termination of Parental Rights Case, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 8, 1992, at 1 (no
such action would lie in New York because statute drafted very carefully).
50 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.461(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
51 Id. § 39.461(1) of the Florida statute provides, in pertinent part: "Any person who has
knowledge of the facts alleged may file a petition for termination of parental rights." Id.
52 See In re C.B., 561 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Paternal grandmother
qualified as one "who ha[d] knowledge of the facts" pursuant to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.461(1).
Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.404 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). Chapter 39 of the Florida Code
also deals with dependency proceedings. Id. Such a provision is analogous to § 39.461(1)
because it employs the same language, i.e., "any person who has knowledge of the facts
alleged." Id. It should follow, therefore, that the manner in which the Florida judiciary is
interpreting § 39.404(1) will be the manner in which it interprets § 39.461(1). Id.; see, e.g.,
In re J.M., 579 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. 1991). Under a chapter 39 dependency proceeding, a
guardian ad litem is included within meaning of a person "who has knowledge of the facts."
Id.; Norris v. Rockfeller, 568 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. 1990). Court-appointed guardians fall
within the meaning of the statute. Id.; In re J.M., 560 So. 2d 343, 343 (Fla. 1990). Maternal
grandparents have standing to file a petition pursuant to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.404(1). Id.
53 Order on Standing, In re Gregory KL, No. C192-5127, 9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 20, 1992)
(Gregory had clear knowledge of facts to form basis for a petition); see also Matthews, supra
note 46, at 8 ("The Florida court had reached the unremarkable conclusion that Gregory
was a 'person' with 'knowledge of the facts' sufficient to bring his own petition.").
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natural parent's rights.54 The court's rationale for granting Greg-
ory standing was based solely upon fundamental constitutional
rights.55 The court asserted that Gregory qualified as a "natural
person" within the meaning of the Florida Constitution, and
therefore, had a right of access to the Florida courts. 56 Addition-
ally, the court stated that minors should be entitled to due pro-
cess, and the constitutional freedom to make private choices with-
out fear of state intervention.57
In contrast, the Court of Appeals held that Gregory, being a mi-
nor, lacked the legal capacity to initiate or maintain an action for
the termination of parental rights.58 The appellate court held that
an adult person of reasonable judgment and integrity is required
to conduct the litigation for a child.59 Further, the court held that
the lower court misconstrued the Florida parental termination
statute, and stated that the term "any other person who has
knowledge of the facts alleged" does not include children.60 The
appellate court, however, determined that this error was harm-
less, and did not overrule the lower court's order granting
standing.6 '
While the United States Supreme Court has extended constitu-
tional rights to children, the Court has clearly stated that these
54 Order on Standing, Gregory K (No. C192-5127) (Gregory qualified as "any person with
knowledge of the facts alleged"); see also Betsy Hart, Family Will Pay, ATLANTA J. &
CoNsT., Oct. 2, 1992, at A13 ("The typical 12-year-old [boy] isn't responsible.. . enough to
consistently do his chores and homework. Now we're to believe that Gregory Kingsley de-
cided to sue his parents... and see it through to victory all on his own.").
55 Order on Standing, Gregory I. (No. C192-5127) (delineating rights Gregory was enti-
tled to under Florida Constitution).
56 Order on Standing, Gregory K (No. C192-5127) (Florida Constitution "guarantees to
all natural persons the right to pursue happiness").
57 Id. 1 4. The Gregory K court held that "all natural persons have the right to make
private choices." Id. "[Tihe right of privacy set forth in the Florida Constitution extends to
every natural person and that minors, as natural persons, are entitled to the same privacy
rights which are afforded to persons who have reached the age of majority." Id. 5 (citing
In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989)).
58 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8645, at *6-7 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1993).
59 Id. at *9. (citing Garner v. I.E. Schilling Co., 174 So. 837, 838 (Fla. 1937)).
60 Id. at *8-9 (citing In re C.B., 561 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)). The lan-
guage of the Florida Parental Termination provision, "any other person who has knowl-
edge," does not include children but rather only those mature individuals that are in "pecu-
liar position so that such knowledge can be reasonably inferred." Examples of a person in a
"peculiar position such that knowledge can be reasonably inferred" include: the judge fa-
miliar with the file, the child's guardian or attorney, or "friends of the parties who, because
of their proximity, would be expected to have such knowledge." Id.
61 Id. at *12. The appellate court held that the lower court's error granting standing was
improper but harmless. Id. The court so decided because Gregory was not the only individ-
ual to file a petition on his behalf. Id. Separate petitions were filed by his foster father,
guardian ad litem, HRS, and his foster mother. Id.
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rights are not as extensive as those afforded to adults. 62 There are
occasions when the state must protect children from their naivety
and immaturity, and as a result, circumscribe their rights.63 The
lower court in Gregory K, however, did not intervene on Gregory's
behalf.64 The court allowed Gregory, who was not yet a teenager,
the freedom to make a very serious decision without any showing
that he was cognizant of its profound ramifications.6 5
The relevant inquiry in determining child standing should be
whether the state has a duty to intercede and protect children
from their inexperience and immaturity. Courts must, pursuant
to this duty of parens patriae, determine whether children are ca-
pable of protecting their own interests before they allow children
to make decisions that will impact the rest of their lives.
2. Maturity: The Test to Determine Child Standing
Joseph Goldstein believes that children should have the protec-
tion of both their parents and the state until they reach adult-
hood.66 Opponents, in contrast, advocate that children should be
62 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761-65 (1982) (state can regulate obscen-
ity with respect to minors to greater extent than if adults involved); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (delineating and explaining reasons why children not afforded full
extent of constitutional rights); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971) (right
to jury trial in juvenile court proceeding not required); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("state may deprive children . . . [right to vote,]
deprivations that would be ... intolerable [to] adults"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 168 (1944) ("The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like
actions of adults.").
63 See Baird, 443 U.S. at 635. The justification for not extending a child's rights to those
of an adult is based upon the vulnerability of the infant. Id. The Court stated: "[A]lthough
children are protected by the same constitutional guarantees [as adults] ... the state is
entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability.... ." Id. The Jus-
tices noted that children lack the knowledge and understanding required to make certain
complex decisions and therefore merit the protection of the state. Id.; Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). While the Supreme Court granted children the right to
give effective consent to terminate a pregnancy, the Court specifically limited its holding to
children who were mature enough to understand their decisions. Id.; Brumley, supra note
2, at 339-40. The state often has the authority to infringe upon a child's constitutional
rights in order to safeguard the child's interest. Id.; William Grady & Terry Wilson, Kids
Find Court, Not Mom, Dad, Have Last Word, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1992, at C1. Children do
not have the requisite capacity to understand complex situations, such as the termination
of parental rights. Id. Therefore, the authors conclude that "[i]t would be the worst idea in
the world if... children [were given] the right to sue." Id.; supra notes 3-4 and accompany-
ing text (discussing state's duty to protect those unable to protect themselves).
64 Order on Standing, In re Gregory K., No. C192-5127 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 20, 1992).
65 Id.
66 See JOSEPH GoLDsTN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHiLD 9-14 (1973)
[hereinafter GoLsTEn, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]. Although children should be af-
forded respect, they are competent enough to "fend" for themselves. Id. Children have not
developed the cognitive skills that competent adults possess. Id.
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presumed able and competent regardless of their age.6 7 The for-
mer is a more rational approach as it safeguards the welfare of
children. The latter makes the mistake of treating children like
adults, regardless of their cognitive ability and experiences, plac-
ing children in a vulnerable position. Nevertheless, a standard
whereby all children would be prohibited from making their own
decisions is overly restrictive. Such a standard infringes upon the
privacy of those children who possess sufficient cognitive ability
and experience to make informed decisions. Courts must fashion
a test to distinguish between children who are able to make such
decisions from those who require the state's assistance.
Recent Supreme Court case law specifies groups of children en-
titled to make informed decisions, free of state intervention.6" In
Bellotti v. Baird,69 the Supreme Court held that a statute requir-
ing a minor to obtain parental consent before undergoing an abor-
tion was unconstitutional. 70 The statute was invalidated because
it prevented fully competent children from making serious deci-
sions by themselves.71 The Court, however, did not invalidate the
state's duty to protect the child from her inexperience." In order
to safeguard the interests of the child, the Court held that a child
must first demonstrate that she is well informed and sufficiently
mature to decide to undergo an abortion. v3 Thereafter, the child
would be free to make the decision, as would any other competent
adult.7 ' A court can also relax its obligation to safeguard a child's
welfare if the child meets certain requirements set forth in eman-
67 See RICHARD FARSON, BIRTuRGHTS 9 (1974). Children, no matter how young, have the
potential to act for themselves. Id. "Children, like adults, should have the right to decide
matters which affect them most directly." Id. at 27. Children should not have to get permis-
sion for those activities that adults can do without permission. Id.; JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE
FROM CHILDHOOD 18 (1974). The rights, privileges, duties, and responsibilities of adult citi-
zens should be made available to children of all ages. Id.; CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPO-
RARY PERSPECTIVES 33 (Patricia A- Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979). The presumption
that all children are incompetent is unduly restrictive. Id. A more appropriate presumption
is that all individuals, including children, be presumed competent until proven otherwise.
Id.
68 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979) (statute requiring minor to obtain
parental consent for abortion was unwarranted intrusion on child's right to privacy and,
therefore, unconstitutional); see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75
(1976) (granted child right to give effective consent to terminate pregnancy).
69 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
70 Id. at 651.
71 Id. at 643-44.
72 Id. at 635.
73 Id. at 643.
74 Id.
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cipation statutes.7 5 Under emancipation statutes, children may be
relieved of their legal disability if they can demonstrate to the
court that state protection is unnecessary.7
6
75 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 64 (Deering 1990), which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A minor may petition the superior court of the county in which he or she resides or
is temporarily domiciled for a declaration of emancipation. The petition shall be veri-
fied and shall set forth with specificity all of the following facts:
(1) That he or she is at least 14 years of age.
(2) That he or she willingly lives separate and apart from his or her parents or legal
guardian with the consent or acquiescence of his or her parents or legal guardian.
(3) That he or she is managing his or her own financial affairs; and evidence of this
the minor shall complete and attach a declaration of income and expenses as provided
in Section 1285.50 of the California Rules of Court.
(4) That the source of his or her income is not derived from any activity declared to
be a crime by the laws of the State of California or the laws of the United States.
Id.; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150 (West 1993), which reads, in pertinent part:
Any minor who has reached his sixteenth birthday and is residing in this state or
any parent or guardian of such minor may petition the superior court for juvenile mat-
ters for the district in which either the minor or his parents or guardian resides for a
determination that the minor named in the petition be emancipated. The petition shall
be verified and shall state plainly:
(1) The facts which bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the court,
(2) the name date of birth, sex and residence of the minor,
(3) the name and residence of his parent, parents or guardian, and
(4) the name of the petitioner and his relationship to the minor. Upon the filing of
the petition the court shall cause a summons to be issued to the minor and his parent
parents or guardian in the manner provided in section 46b-128.
Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-717 (Michie 1992), which reads, in pertinent part:
Any juvenile who is 16 years of age or older and who has resided in the same county
in North Carolina or on federal territory within the boundaries of North Carolina for
six months next preceding the filing of the petition may petition the court in that
county for a judicial decree of emancipation.
Id.; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.555 (1992), which provides, in relevant part:
(1) A juvenile court upon the written application of a minor who is domiciled within
the jurisdiction of such court is authorized to enter a decree of emancipation in the
manner provided in OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.565. A decree of emancipation shall
serve only to:
(a) Recognize the minor as an adult for the purposes of contracting and conveying
establishing a residence suing and being sued and recognize the minor as an adult for
purposes of the criminal laws of this state.
(b) Terminate as to the parent and child relationship the provisions of OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 109.010 until the child reaches the age of majority.
(c) Terminate as to the parent and child relationship the provisions of OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 109.053, 109.100, 419.513, 419.515 and 419.519.
(2) A decree of emancipation shall not affect any age qualification for purchasing
alcoholic liquor the requirements for obtaining a marriage license nor the minor's sta-
tus under OR § 109.510.
Id.
76 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-718(6) (Michie 1992). In North Carolina, before the
court emancipates the child, the child must show the court how he or she intends to live on
his or her own. Id.; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.565(1)(c) (1992). In Oregon, the relevant
inquiry is "[w]hether the [child] can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the
[child] is sufficiently mature and knowledgeable to manage the minor's affairs without pa-
rental assistance." Id.; Sanford N. Katz et al., Emancipating Our Children-Coming of
Legal Age in America, 7 F m. L.Q. 211, 214 (1973). A reoccurring theme in both common
law emancipation and statutory emancipation is that the child be of sufficient maturity and
knowledge. Id. at 232-38; DAvis & ScHwARTz, supra note 41, at 39-42. The authors provide
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The state's duty, as parens patriae, is similarly limited by medi-
cal consent statutes.77 In both Mississippi and Arkansas, for ex-
ample, children who can demonstrate sufficient maturity are enti-
tled to make their own decisions regarding their medical
treatment.78
Courts should apply the standards found in Bellotti, the emanci-
pation statutes, and medical consent statutes. Further, courts
should be convinced that a child is mature and experienced, and
that the implications of a decision to terminate parental rights are
fully understood. These suggestions, however, should not be con-
sidered all-inclusive in evaluating a child's maturity. A more com-
prehensive analysis is needed. Such an evaluation should begin
with the presumption that all children require the protection of
the state. Thereafter, a court should determine the standard of
proof the child must meet to establish that the child is of sufficient
maturity and experience. Children that are less than six years of
age should prove to the court, beyond any reasonable doubt, that
they are mature and competent. Between the ages of six and
twelve, children should carry this burden by clear and convincing
evidence. Once children reach the age of thirteen, they should be
required to carry their burden by a preponderance of the evidence.
Once the standard of proof has been established, the court
should determine whether the child is of sufficient maturity and
understanding by examining the child's: (1) scholastic achieve-
ment; (2) intellectual ability; (3) ability to solve both everyday and
complex theoretical problems; (4) "street smarts"; (5) behavior
under both normal and stressful stimuli; (6) attention span; (7)
exposure to the community, i.e., association with groups and orga-
nizations; (8) extracurricular pursuits; (9) peers and their age,
competency, and maturity; (10) ability to distinguish right from
wrong and reality from imagination; (11) role model(s); (12) self-
esteem and resistance to peer pressure; (13) psychiatric evalua-
an overview of common law and statutory emancipation. Id.
77 See, e.g., Aim CODE ANN. § 20-9-602 (Michie 1991). Before a child is allowed to con-
sent to medical treatment the state requires that they demonstrate that they are either
emancipated or of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of
the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures for himself. Id.; Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-3 (1972) (same).
78 See ARm CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (Michie 1991) ("any unemancipated minor of suffi-
cient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of a proposed surgical or
medical treatment or procedures, for himself'); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(h) (1991)
(same).
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tion; (14) recognition and respect for authority; and (15) ability to
meaningfully discern between "natural," "adoptive," and "foster"
parents. This is not an exhaustive list of factors, rather, it empha-
sizes the importance of a detailed, in-depth evaluation of a child's
maturity. Although the concept that a child must be required to
prove maturity to terminate parental rights is not widely accepted
in this country, it does find support in another common-law juris-
diction.7" A determination of a child's maturity must be made
before children are permitted to terminate the rights of their nat-
ural parents.
II. DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE
FOSTER PARENTS' INFLUENCE
As a general rule, an important factor in parental termination
proceedings is whether such termination is in the best interests of
the child.8 0 A natural parent's rights cannot be terminated, how-
79 See Jan Colley, "Divorce" Teenager Made Word of Court, Nov. 6, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. A fourteen-year-old, pursuant to the 1989 Children Act,
demonstrated that he was mature enough to understand the ramifications of his decision
and was entitled to initiate parental termination proceedings. Id.; Gavin Cordon, How 11-
Year-Old "Divorced" Her Parents, Nov. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
File. In England, minors are entitled to seek "divorce" from their parents pursuant to the
1989 Children Act, provided that the court is satisfied that the child is of "sufficient age
and understanding." Id.
80 See D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973) (best interests constituted rele-
vant factor in parental termination proceeding); see also In re KS., 515 P.2d 130, 132 (Colo.
1973) (paramount consideration is child's best interests); In re A-B.E., 564 A.2d 751, 754
(D.C. 1989) ("legal touchstone" in any parental rights termination proceeding is best inter-
ests of child, and this interest is "controlling"); Elrod v. Hall County Dep't of Family &
Children Serv., 220 S.E.2d 726, 728 (Ga. 1975) (child's welfare is paramount); In re
Ramelow, 121 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ill. 1954) (primary interest is child's welfare); In re Wardle,
207 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Iowa 1973) (primary consideration is welfare and best interests of
child); Stubbs v. Hammmond, 135 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa 1965) (primary concern is welfare
of child in custody proceedings); In re D.O., 806 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Mo. 1991) (primary con-
cern of court in parental termination hearing is best interests of child); In re Vikse, 413
P.2d 876, 878 (Mont. 1966) (court must be concerned with child's best interests); Sernaker
v. Ehrlich, 468 P.2d 5, 6 (Nev. 1970) (primary consideration and dominant purpose is
child's best interest); In re Montgomery, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251 (N.C. 1984) (child's welfare or
best interests is paramount); Wilson v. Wilson, 153 S.E.2d 349, 351 (N.C. 1967) (best inter-
ests or child's welfare is paramount consideration); In re Dake, 180 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ohio
1961) (primary consideration is child's welfare); In re Vilas, 475 P.2d 615, 617 (Okla. 1970)
(judge was guided by child's best interests "in respect to its temporal and its mental and
moral welfare"); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Zinzer, 533 P.2d 355, 357 (Or. 1975) (pri-
mary consideration is best interests of children); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Wade, 527
P.2d 753, 761 (Or. 1974) (same); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Patton, 485 P.2d 653, 654
(Or. 1971) (same); In re Sego, 513 P.2d 831, 833 (Wash. 1973) (courts attempt to protect
rights of parents and children, giving primary consideration to child's welfare); State ex rel.
Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 227 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Wisc. 1975) (paramount consider-
ation is child's best interests); see also GoLrsTErN, BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTS, supra note
66, at 7 (law must treat child's interests as paramount, which is "in society's best inter-
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ever, simply because such an action would be in the child's best
interests."' Rather, termination is conditioned upon a finding of
abandonment, neglect, or abuse.8 2
Generally, the best interests standard is most relevant in cases
involving adoption, foster care, and divorce custody.8 3 Determin-
ing a child's best interests involves consideration of the views of
the child, the parents, the state, as well as even the child's attor-
ney.84 Some states utilize the best interests standard in termina-
tion of parental rights statutes, 5 while others leave this decision
primarily to the discretion of the courts.8 6
ests"); Fallek, supra note 40, at 725 (from psychological perspective, there is little dispute
that child's best interests are 'paramount" in decisions affecting circumstances in which
children will live); Daniel W. Clark, Note, Best Interests: The Courts' Polar Star Illuminates
Foster Parents' Concerns, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1317, 1328 (1986) (North Carolina parental ter-
mination statute's basic premise regards child's best interests as "pivotal factor" in decid-
ing termination proceedings).
81 See In re Massey, 341 N.E.2d 405, 406 (111. 1976) (parents' unfitness or consent war-
rants termination of parental rights); see also In re Wardle, 207 N.W.2d 554, 556, 561 (Iowa
1973) (adjudication of neglect or dependency can lead to parental termination); S.K.L v.
Smith, 480 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Mo. 1972) (specific conditions must exist before terminating
parental rights); Berrien v. Greene County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 217 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Va.
1975) (best interests did not justify parental termination without demonstrating mother's
unfitness).
82 See In re C.O., 541 P.2d 330, 331 (Colo. 1975) (neglect can lead to parental termina-
tion); see also In re Griffin, 210 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1973) (adjudication of neglect can
result in parental rights' termination); In re Hartman, 199 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Neb. 1972) (ne-
glect of children by natural mother resulted in termination of her parental rights); In re
R.W.B., 241 N.W.2d 546, 548-49 (N.D. 1976) (minor child subject to neglect and abuse lead
to termination of parental rights); In re H., 206 N.W.2d 871, 872 (N.D. 1973) (court termi-
nated natural mother's rights because it found child to be "deprived"); Magallon v. State,
523 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. 1975) (before parental termination, court must find conduct to
cause present danger to physical or emotional well-being of child).
83 See Brumley, supra note 2, at 354 (best interests is "governing standard with regard
to children in family law cases involving adoption, foster care, and custody after divorce").
84 See Christopherson, supra note 40, at 1284 (best interests standard serves competing
interests of parent, child, and state); see also Hayes & Morse, supra note 39, at 440 (natural
parents, child, and state are involved in termination and adoption proceedings).
85 See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-102 (1986) (if court believes after hearing that best
interests of parties, including child, does not require parental termination, then court shall
issue order dismissing the petition); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-a-112 (West 1992) (re-
quires showing of clear and convincing evidence that termination is in child's best inter-
ests); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1108 (1981) (court shall terminate parental rights if it finds
it to be in best interests of child); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-63 (1993) (termination of parental
rights must be necessary for "protection and preservation" of the best interests of child);
IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(e) (Supp. 1992) (if termination is in best interests of child, court may
grant order terminating parental rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-4 (West Supp. 1992)
(termination proceeding requires analysis of best interests of child); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 48.415, 48.426, 48.427 (West 1992) (best interests standard and factors to be weighed).
86 See, e.g., In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482,485 (Colo. 1985) (best interests of child should be
considered with respect to termination of natural parents' rights); Daber v. Division of
Child Protective Servs., 470 A.2d 723, 726 (Del. 1983) (court may terminate parental rights
if facts justifying termination of parental rights exist and termination is in child's best
interests); Burk v. Department of Health and Rehab. Serv., 476 So. 2d 1275, 1277 (Fla.
1985) (parents' rights to custody of their children may only be taken away where welfare of
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A. Best Interests Pursuant to State Statutes
Few parental termination statutes define what constitutes the
best interests of the child.8 7 Several statutes, however, provide
that several factors be considered in ascertaining a child's best in-
terests: (1) the child's physical and emotional needs, as well as the
need for a stable family unit; (2) the child's attachment to the nat-
ural or foster parents; (3) the length of the child's separation from
the natural parents; and (4) the child's ability to become a member
of the substitute home.88 Other statutes, conversely, do not enu-
merate such factors, leaving it to the courts to determine the
child's best interests in an ad hoc manner.8 9
B. The Policy Underlying the Determination of Best Interests
The purpose of the best interests standard is to promote and
protect the welfare of the child.90 It is well established that chil-
dren have a definite interest in securing a stable home.9 ' Further,
a child's mental and physical well-being is substantially depen-
best interests of child requires termination of parental rights); J.K.C. v. Fountain County
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 470 N.E.2d 88, 92-93 (Ind. 1984) (must show that termination is in
child's best interests); In re J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Minn. 1986) (child's best interests
determination lacked specific guidelines); Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best
Interest of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268 (1986) (some
states leave best interests determination primarily to court's discretion).
87 See Christopherson, supra note 40, at 1273 (few states which have adopted best inter-
ests approach in parental termination statutes offer definition of "best interests").
88 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.467(2)(f) (West 1992) (court must consider (1) child's
ability to form significant relationship with parental substitute, and (2) likelihood that
child will enter into more stable and permanent relationship as result of parental termina-
tion); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-81(a) (1992) (court shall consider child's need for secure and
stable home); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055(2) (1993) (court must consider: (1) child's
attachment to relevant persons; (2) length of attachment and separation from relevant per-
sons; and (3) child's ability to integrate into substitute placement or back into parents'
home, when deciding whether to terminate parental rights); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.426(3)(f)
(1992) (court shall consider whether child will be entering into more permanent and stable
family relationship if parental rights are terminated).
89 See, e.g., In re Three Minor Children, 406 A.2d 14, 19 (Del. 1979) ("best interests"
standard is undefined in termination statute, therefore, flexibility in analyzing facts in
particular context must be applied); see also Clark, supra note 80, at 1328 (regardless of
statutory language, best interests standard remains highly subjective, with court discre-
tion playing strategic role).
90 See Christopherson, supra note 40, at 1286 (consideration of child's best interests fur-
thered Juvenile Court Act's purpose of protecting children's welfare). But see id. at 1284
(best interests standard also protects the natural parents' interests, since state must show
parental unfitness before it can institute legal proceedings interfering with family
matters).
91 See Bellah, supra note 3, at 488 (legislature has noticed that children have a "strong
interest in having a secure and stable home"); see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE
THE BEST INTEREsTs OF THE CHILD 11 (1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS] (every child entitled to "permanent place in a family of his own").
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dent upon the continuation of stable personal relationships.92 A
permanent home is vital for a child to develop a healthy family
relationship and to avoid tension generated by the uncertainty of
care and custodial arrangements.93
When a child experiences the death of a parent, divorce, foster
care, or adoption, continuity and stability are interrupted.94 There
is a strong interest in terminating parental rights if a physically
and emotionally secure substitute home is available, and the nat-
ural parents have been unable to provide a nurturing environ-
ment for the child.9 5 Accordingly, the best interests goal of state
intervention 96 involves protecting both a child's physical and psy-
chological well-being.9 7
C. Foster Parents and the Best Interests of the Child
The term "foster parent" is defined as an adult who is not a rela-
tive of the natural parents, and who is granted physical custody of
a child, either by the child's natural parents or by a child welfare
agency. 98 Parental responsibility is divided among the agency, the
foster parents, and the natural parents.99 Typically, the agency
retains legal custody over the child, the foster parents are respon-
sible for the child's day-to-day supervision, and the natural par-
92 See Bartlett, supra note 39, at 902 ("child's healthy growth depends in large part upon
the continuity of his personal relationships"); see also GoLDSTEnq, BEFORE THE BEST INTER-
ESTS, supra note 66, at 8-9 ("ongoing interactions between parents and children become for
each child the starting point for an all-important line of development that leads toward
adult functioning").
93 See, e.g., In re David B., 154 Cal. Rptr. 63, 71 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (longer child is
without permanence, greater threat to child's physical and emotional development); see
Bellah, supra note 3, at 488-89 (stressing importance of permanence in child's upbringing);
see also Bartlett, supra note 39, at 904 (permanence is achieved when child feels a tie to a
family; absence of sense of permanence may cause child to have difficulty learning self-
control and absorbing a value system).
94 See Bartlett, supra note 39, at 902 ("divorce, death of a parent, foster care, or adoption
intrude on a child's family life").
95 See Bellah, supra note 3, at 489 (if"physically and emotionally stable substitute home
is available," child has interest in terminating parental rights).
96 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances of state inter-
vention in state's role as parens patriae).
97 See GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 66, at 4 (best interests stan-
dard concerns promotion of child's emotional and physical health).
98 Id. at 23 (explaining foster care system).
99 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
826-27 n.16 (1977) (foster child's "loyalties, emotional involvements, and responsibilities"
are divided among three categories of adult authority figures); see also Bartlett, supra note
39, at 939-40 (describing foster care system organization). See generally Michael Wald,
State Intervention on Behalf of 'Neglected' Children: Standards for Removal of Children
from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 645 (1976) (describing existing foster care system).
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ents reserve authority for certain decisions, such as consent to
medical treatment for the child.'00 Because the state retains cus-
tody over the child, foster parents experience difficulty in securing
legal custody.1° 1
Foster parents, however, do possess the requisite standing to
assert the claim that they have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the integrity of their family unit. 102 Further, foster par-
ents have standing to intervene in independent proceedings to ter-
minate natural parents' rights. 10 3
Foster parents often seek the termination of natural parental
rights upon request by the agency to surrender their foster
child. 0 14 Desire for such termination is typically triggered by the
100 See Smith, 431 U.S. at 827-28 n.20. Generally, children are placed in foster care
either by voluntary placement or by court order. Id. at 824. Voluntary placement involves
the natural parent's signing a written agreement transferring the "child's care and custody
to an authorized child welfare agency." Id. at 816. On the other hand, children may enter
foster care via court order if abused or neglected by their natural parents. Id. at 828. In this
situation, the consequences of foster care placement do not significantly differ from volun-
tary placement, except that the parent is not entitled to the child's return upon demand. Id.
101 See Barlett, supra note 39, at 940 (because state welfare agency has legal custody
over child, both foster and legal parents may experience problems securing or regaining
legal custody).
102 See Smith, 431 U.S. at 842 n.45. The child's foster parents challenged New York
procedures by which foster parents could contest removal of their foster children. Id. at
819-20. The foster parents claimed that these procedures infringed upon the foster family's
"liberty interest" under the Fourteenth Amendment in the integrity of their family unit. Id.
at 839. The Supreme Court held that foster parents had standing based on alleged injury to
the child or to the foster family. Id. at 841-42 n.44 & 45.
103 See CoNN. GEN STAT. § 46b-129(i) (1986) (foster parent shall have standing in mat-
ters concerning placement or revocation of commitment of foster child living with foster
parent); N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4C-61(c)(5) (Supp. 1992) (notice of hearing shall be provided
to temporary caretaker); see also In re Diana P., 424 A.2d 178, 180 (N.H. 1980) (foster
parent had standing to petition for parental termination because of lengthy role in loco
parentis to child); In re D.Y.F.S. v. D.T., 410 A.2d 79, 82 (N.J. 1979) (foster parents entitled
to intervention to present testimony in parental termination proceedings); Harris County
Child Welfare Unit v. Caloudas, 590 S.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Tex. 1979) (foster parent had
standing to bring adoption petition concerning child already in their custody). But see In re
Juvenile Appeal, 449 A.2d 165, 166 (Conn. 1982) (foster parents did not have standing in
parental termination proceeding); Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499-500 (Tex. 1982).
The foster parents lacked standing to join as a party to a termination proceeding where the
sole interest which was alleged by the foster parents in intervening was their wish to adopt
the child, if the parent-child relationship with the natural parents was terminated. Id.
Though foster parents often provide long-term family care for their foster child, they "rou-
tinely fare worse in custody disputes with parents than do other third party caretakers."
Id. Bartlett, supra note 39, at 940. Foster parents are typically "denied standing to object"
when the state requests the foster parents to surrender their foster child. Id. Further, even
if standing is granted, foster parents are unlikely to succeed, especially if the child may be
reunited with the natural family. Id.
104 See Michael G. Walsh, Standing of Foster Parent to Seek Termination of Rights of
Foster Child's Natural Parents, 21 A.L.R. 535, 540 (4th ed. 1983). The agency may ask the
foster parents to surrender the child in order to "place the child in another foster home so
as to prevent the strengthening of the bond between the foster child and the foster parents,
to make the child available for adoption by third persons, or to return the child to the home
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development of a strong bond between the foster child and the fos-
ter parent. 10 5 As Justice William Brennan observed in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform: 06 "It is
not surprising that many children, particularly those that enter
foster care at a very early age and have little or no contact with
their natural parents during extended stays in foster care, often
develop deep emotional ties with their foster parents." °7
Foster parents face various difficulties and frustrations in their
relationship with their foster child.10 They are required to "as-
sume the role of substitute parents, performing all the tasks of
natural parents, yet [are] expected not to form a deep emotional
attachment" to the child. 109 While a child's emotional bond with
his foster parents should be a factor in determining a child's best
interests, it is a subject of recent controversy in the legal
community.
of its rehabilitated natural parents." Id.
105 See Bellah, supra note 3, at 486 (foster parents may become their foster child's "de
facto" parents through development of a strong psychological bond); see also GOLDSTEIN,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 66, at 17-20, 98 (psychological parent is defined as
"one who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay
and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's
physical needs").
106 431 U.S. 816 (1976).
107 Id. at 836. While foster parents may have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in the integrity of the foster family unit, stemming from the psychological relationship with
the child, the pre-removal procedures adopted by New York were constitutionally suffi-
cient. Id. at 836. Federal courts, however, continue to hold that foster parents do not have a
liberty interest in their relationship with a foster child, and therefore, are not entitled to
due process protections. Id.; see also Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1019 (2d Cir. 1982).
The foster parent's due process rights had not been violated when her foster children were
removed from her care without a hearing. Id.; Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600
F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1979). Foster parents have a limited constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in their relationship with their foster children such that due process is re-
quired to be fulfilled. Id.; Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's
Serv., 563 F.2d 1200, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977). The relationship between a foster parent and his
foster child was not within a constitutionally protected familial right to privacy as pro-
tected under Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; Crim v. Harrison, 552 F. Supp. 37, 41 (N.D.
Miss. 1982). Foster parents had "no liberty or property interests entitling them to due pro-
cess protection." Id.; Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728, 741 (W.D. Mich. 1980). Foster
parents "had no reasonable expectation . . . that liberty right had developed . . . which
would be protected from state intervention." Id.
108 See HoRowrrz & HUNTER supra note 33, at 18 (foster parents face "variety of dilem-
mas and frustrations in their relationship with their foster children").
109 Id. This expectation holds true even if foster parents have cared for a particular fos-
ter child for many years. Id. Further, foster parents become frustrated because they lack
"full legal control and responsibility" over their foster children, and have been prohibited
from increasing such control. Id.; GOLDSTEIN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 66,
at 19, 40-42. Foster parents may be characterized as "psychological" parents. Id.; see also
STEIN, supra note 1, at 76. Traditionally, 'foster parents were 'admonished' not to form
emotional ties to [their foster] children." Id.
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1. Gregory K
In Gregory K, Judge Kirk concluded that the termination of Ms.
Kingsley's parental rights was in the "manifest best interests of
the child," and that "this was established by clear and convincing
evidence." 110 Judge Kirk applied section 39.467(2) of the Florida
Statute on Termination of Parental Rights to arrive at this deter-
mination."' This section explicitly takes into consideration the re-
lationship a child has formed with a foster parent in order to de-
termine the child's best interests. 1 12
Specifically, the statute considers the following: (1) the child's
capability to develop a significant relationship with a parental
substitute and the probability that the child will enter into a more
stable and permanent family resulting from parental termination;
(2) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable, healthy
environment, and the child's desire to continue living in this envi-
ronment; and (3) the depth of the relationship between the child
and the present parental substitute.1 13
110 In re Gregory K., No. JU90-5245, at 9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992).
111 Id. (citing Proceedings Relating to Juveniles, Termination of Parental Rights
§ 39.467 (1992)).
112 Id.
113 Id. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
(1) In a hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall con-
sider the grounds for termination and the manifest best interests of the child. The need
for termination of parental rights shall be established by clear and convincing
evidence.
(2) For the purpose of determining the manifest best interests of the child, the court
shall consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The ability and disposition of the parent or parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under
state law in lieu of medical care, or other material needs.
(b) The capacity of the parent or parents to care for the child to the extent that the
child's health and well-being will not be endangered upon the child's return home.
(c) The present mental and physical health needs of the child and the future needs
of the child to the extent that such future needs can be ascertained based on the
present condition of the child.
(d) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the child and the
child's present parent or parents, siblings, and other relatives and the degree of
harm to the child arising from the termination of parental rights and duties.
(e) The likelihood of an older child remaining in long-term foster care upon termi-
nation of parental rights due to emotional or behavioral problems or any special
needs of the child.
(f) The child's ability to form a significant relationship with a parental substitute
and the likelihood that the child will enter into a more stable and permanent family
relationship as a result of permanent termination of parental rights and duties.
(g) The length of time that the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(h) The depth of the relationship existing between the child and the present
custodian.
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The Gregory K court also considered: (1) the inability of Greg-
ory's natural mother to provide for his needs; (2) the probability
that Gregory's health and well-being would be endangered if he
returned to his mother; (3) Gregory's special developmental needs,
and how they were best met with his foster parents, the Russ fam-
ily; (4) the lack of any bond between Gregory, his natural parents,
and natural siblings; (5) the length of time Gregory was in foster
care (approximately thirty-four of the last thirty-six months of his
life); (6) the availability of permanent family placement with the
Russ family; (7) the length and stability of Gregory's placement
with the Russ family (approximately eleven months), and the sig-
nificant bond which had formed between Gregory and the Russ
family; (8) Gregory's preference to be adopted by the Russ family,
which he repeatedly expressed, and Gregory's maturity as a
twelve-year-old, allowed him sufficient understanding and experi-
ence to express a reasonable preference; (9) the guardian ad li-
tem's recommendation for the termination of Gregory's natural
parents' rights, and the determination that it was in Gregory's
best interests to be placed in the care of the Russ family; and (10)
the unavailability of a suitable permanent custody arrangement
with a relative of Gregory's mother, because of the lack of any con-
nection between Gregory and his natural family."'
Indeed, the Gregory K court, as well as the Florida legislature,
valued the role of the foster family in determining a child's best
interests."15 Consideration of the foster-family's influence should
(i) The reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a
preference.
(j) The recommendations for the child provided by the child's guardian ad litem or
legal representative.
(k) Any suitable permanent custody arrangement with a relative of the child.
Id.
114 Gregory K. (No. JU90-5245) at 9-10.
115 Id.; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2353 (1989 & Supp. 1992). The District of Colum-
bia's parental termination statute provides, in pertinent part:
(b) In determining whether it is in the child's best interests that the parent and child
relationship be terminated, a judge shall consider each of the following factors:
(1) the child's need for continuity of care and caretakers and for timely integration
into a stable and permanent home, taking into account the differences in the develop-
ment and the concept of time of children of different ages;
(2) the physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved to the de-
gree that such affects the welfare of the child, the decisive consideration being the
physical, mental and emotional needs of the child;
(3) the quality of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her
parent, siblings, relative and/or caretakers, including the foster parent;. ..
(4) to the extent feasible, the child's opinion of his or her own best interests in the
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be a vital factor in the best interests analysis. This approach rec-
ognizes that there are numerous situations in which a foster par-
ents' rights must be taken into account and, in certain instances,
circumvent the natural parents' rights. Further, courts must ac-
knowledge the foster parent-foster child relationship if the sever-
ance of a strong bond would cause the child substantial psycholog-
ical or emotional harm.
2. New York's Approach to the Foster Parents' Influence
Contrary to the Gregory K decision, the New York Court of Ap-
peals announced in In re Michael B. 6 that the fitness of the bio-
logical parents must be the primary factor in determining a child's
best interests. 1 17 The New York Court of Appeals, therefore, se-
verely restricted the foster-parents' influence. 1 8 Michael B. in-
volved an appeal from a custody determination and centered upon
the meaning of the statutory term "best interests of the child."" 9
The court, in assessing what constituted the "best interests of the
child," concentrated on what weight should be given to the foster
matter; and
(5) evidence that drug-related activity continues to exist in a child's home environ-
ment after intervention and services have been provided pursuant to section 106(a) of
the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, effective September 23, 1977.
Id.; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.426 (West 1992). The Wisconsin statute provides, in pertinent
part:
(2) Standard. The best interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor considered
by the court in determining the disposition of all proceedings under this subchapter.
(3) Factors. In considering the best interests of the child under this section the court
shall consider but not be limited to the following:
(a) The likelihood of the child's adoption after termination.
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the disposition and, if appli-
cable, at the time the child was removed from the home.
(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the parent of other family
members, and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever these relationships.
(d) The wishes of the child.
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the child.
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family
relationship as a result of the termination, taking into account the conditions of the
child's current placement, the likelihood of future placements and the results of prior
placements.
Id.
116 80 N.Y.2d 299, 604 N.E.2d 122, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1992).
117 Id. at 309, 604 N.E.2d at 127, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 65 ("a biological parent has a right to
the care and custody of a child, superior to that of others, unless the parent has abandoned
that right or is proven unfit to assume the duties and privileges of parenthood").
118 Id., 604 N.E.2d at 128, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 66 ("because of the statutory emphasis on the
biological family as best serving a child's long-range needs, the legal rights of foster parents
are necessarily limited").
119 Id. at 303, 604 N.E.2d at 124, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
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child's relationship with his foster family.120
In Michael B., the child was voluntarily placed in foster care by
his mother. 12 Michael, then three months old, was placed in the
care of a foster family, where he remained for more than five
years. 22 Approximately two years after Michael's placement with
his foster family, Catholic Child Care Society (the "Agency")
sought to terminate his biological parents' rights.123 The Agency
alleged that for more than a year following Michael's placement in
foster care, Michael's parents had failed to maintain contact with
him and plan for his future, even though they were financially ca-
pable of doing so. 12 4 Subsequently, Michael's father, a long-time
alcohol and substance abuser, sought custody of his son.' 25
Custody of the child was conditioned on several factors. Specifi-
cally, Michael's father was mandated to: (1) enroll and cooperate
in a parental skills program; (2) periodically submit to drug test-
ing; (3) obtain suitable housing; and (4) submit a plan for his chil-
dren's care during the work day. 126 At the end of this conditional
period, Michael's father was still unemployed and had not submit-
ted to drug testing.127 The family court, however, was satisfied
that "there seemed to be substantial compliance" with the condi-
tions.' 21 The legal guardian, 129 on the other hand, presented a re-
120 Id., 604 N.E.2d at 124, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 62. "The biological father on one side (appel-
lant) and respondent foster parents (joined by respondent law guardian) on the other, each
contend that a custody determination in their favor is in the best interest of the child, as
that term is used in Social Services Law § 392(6), the statute governing dispositions with
respect to children in foster care." Id. at 303-04, 604 N.E.2d at 124, 590 N.Y.S.2d 62.
121 Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d at 304, 604 N.E.2d at 124, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 62. Michael's
mother was unmarried at the time of his birth and listed no father on his birth certificate.
Id., 604 N.E.2d at 124, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 62. At that time, Michael's four siblings were also in
foster care, residing in different homes. Id.
122 Id., 604 N.E.2d at 125, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. Michael's mother never appeared in the proceeding and a finding of permanent
neglect as to her was made when the child turned two years old. Id. The mother died
shortly thereafter. Id.
126 Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 604 N.E.2d at 125, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
127 Id. at 305, 604 N.E.2d at 125, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
128 Id.
129 See BLAc's LAw DIcTIoNARY 706 (6th ed. 1990). "A guardian ad litem is a special
guardian appointed by the court in which a particular litigation is pending to represent an
infant, ward or unborn person in that particular litigation." Id.; see also Brian G. Frase,
Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian Ad Litem,
13 CAL. L. Ray. 16, 29 (1976). The guardian ad litem is legally obligated to act in the child's
best interests. Id.; Tara Lea Muhlhauser, From 'Best' to 'Better The Interests of Children
and the Role of a Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. REv. 633, 641-42 (1990). The role of a
guardian ad litem is to "provide information to the court, explore options or alternatives,
and to negotiate with and among the systems or institutions having an interest in the
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port indicating that Michael might suffer severe psychological
damage if removed from his foster home.130 The guardian, there-
fore, argued for a best interests hearing based on Michael's strong
relationship with his foster family and the lack of any relationship
with his natural father.
13
The Court of Appeals held that returning a child to his biologi-
cal family was the primary goal of the foster care system. 32 The
court addressed the legal standards for determining a child's best
interests 133 and ruled that the fitness of the biological parents
must be the chief factor in determining the child's best inter-
ests.134 Specifically, the court maintained: "A biological parent has
a right to the care and custody of a child, superior to that of
others, unless the parent has abandoned that right or is proven
unfit to assume the duties and privileges of parenthood, even
though the State perhaps could find 'better parents.'' 135 Further,
the court reasoned that focusing on Michael's bond with his foster
family would "undermine the very objective of foster care."'36 The
case." Id.
130 Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d at 305, 604 N.E.2d at 125, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
131 Id. The family court questioned its authority to hold such a hearing, but stayed the
order directing Michael's release to his natural father pending its determination. Id.
Michael's siblings, then approximately twelve, eight, seven, and six years old, were dis-
charged to the father and Michael's litigation continued. Id. Subsequently, the family court
ordered Michael's release to his natural father, concluding that Michael had been "wrong-
fully held in foster care." Id. at 305-06, 604 N.E.2d at 126, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
132 Id. at 309, 604 N.E.2d at 127, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 65. Subsequent to the Court of Appeals
decision, the family court, on the issue of the father's fitness, concluded that he was "fit,
available and capable of adequately providing for the health, safety and welfare of the sub-
ject child" and that it was "in the child's best interest to be returned to his father." Id. at
306, 604 N.E.2d at 126, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 64. The Appellate Division reversed the family
court's order and awarded custody to the foster parents pursuant to Social Services Law
§ 392(6)(b). Id. at 306-07, 604 N.E.2d at 126, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 64. The court looked to
Michael's lengthy stay and psychological relationship with his foster family, which it felt
gave rise to extraordinary circumstances meriting an award of custody to the foster par-
ents. Id. Further, the appellate court concluded that the evidence "overwhelmingly demon-
strate[d] that Michael's foster parents [were] better able than his natural father to provide
for his physical, emotional, and intellectual needs." Id. at 307, 604 N.E.2d at 126, 590
N.Y.S.2d at 64.
133 Id. at 312-15, 604 N.E.2d at 130-32, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 68-70.
134 Id. at 314, 604 N.E.2d at 131, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 69. The court posited that a "child is
not the parent's property, but neither is a child the property of the State." Id. at 309, 604
N.E.2d at 127, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 65. Further, the court reasoned that by "[looking to [both]
the child's rights [and] the parents' rights to bring up their own children, the Legislature
has.., declared that a child's need to grow up with a 'normal family life in a permanent
home' is ordinarily best met in the child's 'natural home.'" Id., 604 N.E.2d at 127, 590
N.Y.S.2d at 65 (citing N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAw § 384-b[l][a][i], [ii]).
135 Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d at 309, 604 N.E.2d at 127, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
136 Id. at 313, 604 N.E.2d at 130, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 68. The court reasoned that "to use the
period during which a child lives with a foster family, and emotional ties that naturally
eventuate, as a ground for comparing the biological parent with the foster parent" acts
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court, however, could not make a final ruling on Michael's custody
since during the pendency of the appeal, Michael's father admit-
ted to neglecting the children in his custody. 3 v
Concurring with the majority opinion in result only, Judge Jo-
seph W. Bellacosa differed with the court's analysis of the best
interests standard.138 Judge Bellacosa argued that courts, in their
fulfillment of the state's role as parens patriae, should be afforded
greater flexibility in determining a child's best interests.'39 Judge
Bellacosa endorsed the Appellate Division's focus on Michael's
strong relationship with his foster family.14 ° Judge Bellacosa ob-
served that the "nuances, complexity and variations of human sit-
uations make the development and application of the... best in-
terests of the child exceedingly difficult," and thus, a broader view
of the best interests determination affords a more realistic consid-
eration of these human conditions.' 4 1 This approach represents a
more comprehensive standard in the determination of a child's
best interests and also properly values any potentially strong
bond that a child may establish with the foster family.
It is undisputed that extremely close emotional bonds may de-
against the goal of the foster care system "as a resource for parents in temporary crisis,
who are then at risk of losing their children once a bond arises with the foster families." Id.
137 Id. at 317, 604 N.E.2d at 133, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 71. The petition alleged that Michael's
father was an alcoholic, used controlled substances, and abused the children. Id., 604
N.E.2d at 133, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 71. The court ordered a new hearing in family court to
determine whether Michael's father was a fit parent. Id. at 318, 604 N.E.2d at 132-33, 590
N.Y.S.2d at 71-72.
138 Id. at 318, 604 N.E.2d at 134, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 72. Judge Bellacosa agreed with Judge
Judith Kaye's opinion that Soc. SERV. LAw § 392(6)(b) "cannot be used to award permanent
custody to foster parents within that statute's intended operation and integrated struc-
ture." Id.
139 Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d at 319, 604 N.E.2d at 134, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
140 Id. at 320-21, 604 N.E.2d at 135, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 73. The Appellate Division
concluded:
In light of the lengthy period of time during which Michael resided with and psycholog-
ically bonded to his foster parents and given the potential for emotional as well as
physical harm to Michael should permanent custody be awarded to his natural father,
we find that... the best interests of this child will be served by allowing him to return
to his foster parents. In view of the testimony presented during the best interests hear-
ing, this court concludes that Michael's natural father is incapable of giving him the
emotional support so vital to his well-being. The testimony presented ... indicated
that an emotional void still existed between Michael and his father despite the eight to
nine months during which they resided together prior to the best interests hearing and
that this void showed no signs of being abridged.
Id.
141 Id. at 320, 609 N.E.2d at 134, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 72. Judge Bellacosa argued that his
approach "better. . . promote[d] the best interests of this youngster with reasonable finality
and the best interests of all others affected by the operation of these rules." Id.
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velop between a foster parent and a foster child. 142 These bonds
usually form when a child has lived with a foster family continu-
ously over a period of time, and where contact with the natural
parents has been minimal or nonexistent. 14 3 This recognition is
predicated upon the principle that "every child requires continuity
of care, an unbroken relationship with at least one adult who is
and wants to be directly responsible for his daily needs."'44
Notwithstanding the protection traditionally accorded to relation-
ships between children and their natural parents, bonds between
foster children and foster parents merit protection as well. In-
deed, "rights which are normally secured over time by biological or
adoptive parents may be lost by their failure to provide continuous
care for their child and earned by those who do."145 The New York
Court of Appeals' view is overly restrictive and represents an in-
adequate approach to determining a child's best interests. The
ideas advocated by Judge Bellacosa in Michael B. and those es-
poused by Judge Kirk in Gregory K are more sensible because
they allow the law to protect real families, not those in name only.
CONCLUSION
Since terminating a natural parent's rights carries profound
consequences, a decision to allow a child standing in such a pro-
142 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
845 n.52 (1977) ("emotional ties between foster parent and foster child are in many cases
quite close, and undoubtedly in some as close as those existing in biological families").
143 See HORowrrz & HUNTER, supra note 33, at 18 (foster parent becomes true "psycho-
logical" parent when child has lived with foster family for long period and where contact
with biological parents has been virtually missing).
144 See GoLusTEnN, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 66, at 40 (authors recognize
need to protect psychological ties that develop over time between foster child and adults
who provide for child's day-to-day care).
145 See GoLDSTEn4, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 66, at 10. When a child is
abandoned or separated from the natural parents for a long period of time, a psychological
bond may form between the child and a parental substitute; such a relationship deserves
protection from state intervention. Id.; see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 843. "[B]iological rela-
tionships are not exclusive determinations of the existence of a family." Id.
[Tihe importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the
society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruc-
tion of children... [n]o one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interde-
pendent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in
the absence of blood relationship. At least where a child has been in foster care as an
infant, has never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for sev-
eral years in the care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family
should hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same
socializing functions, as a natural family.
Id. at 844.
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ceeding warrants careful scrutiny. The child must display suffi-
cient maturity and understanding to demonstrate that state pro-
tection is unnecessary.
Once the standing requirement is satisfied, the court must eval-
uate the child's best interests to determine whether the termina-
tion of natural parents' rights is proper. Courts must recognize
the bond established between a foster parent and a foster child. It
is vital to protect such a bond in order to promote a child's healthy
mental and emotional development. The Gregory K. decision and
the Michael B. concurrence appropriately valued this bond.
Courts have a responsibility to protect children's rights, as well
as a corresponding duty to moderate how these rights are exer-
cised. Ultimately, a court must safeguard a child's interests by
protecting the child from his immaturity, and by promoting stabil-
ity in the child's family environment.
Claudio DeBellis & Marta B. Soja
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